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"The Genie's Out of the Jar": The Development of
Criminal Justice Policy in California
Paul J. Pfingst,* Gregory Thompson,** and Kathleen M. Lewis***
I. INTRODUCTION
No Californian who lived through the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, needs to be
reminded that those times were characterized by high public anxiety over crime.
Crime stories-drug wars, child abductions, rapes, robberies, murders, drive-by
shootings, and crack cocaine dealings-dominated the nightly news and morning
headlines. Parents were unabashedly fearful for the safety of their children, and
Californians everywhere changed the way they lived to avoid becoming a crime
victim.
It is no historical wonder, then, that Californians revamped their criminal
justice system to address their fears. That was predictable. But the scale of the
overhaul-ousting Supreme Court Justices viewed as soft on criminals and
restructuring the laws of criminal procedure and criminal punishment-was
anything but foreseeable.
How these dramatic, sweeping changes took place is the topic of this discussion,
a topic that takes us to the roughest, most rugged edge of democracy.
California law institutionalizes the means for populist revolt. In 1911, through
the California initiative process, California's citizens granted themselves a
significant tool to implement change when they are dissatisfied with their
government. Through it, the people of California circumvent their elected
representatives.' The last thirty years have produced power shifts and new legal
milestones as voters passed state propositions in response to the perceived failure
of the Legislature to act.
The changes in criminal justice have essentially transferred the balance
of power from the legislative and judicial branches of government to the
executive branch. The shift began in 1978 when voters passed the "Briggs
Initiative" to expand the death penalty and then ousted the Bird Supreme
Court because they believed the Court would not enforce it. This shift of
power continues today with the passage of the Gang Violence and Juvenile
Crime Prevention Act, targeting violent juvenile offenders, and Proposition
36, mandating the Drug Treatment Program, as Californians mold the
criminal justice system in their own image. Throughout it all, the public
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I. Ballot provisions play a major role in state government in only California, Colorado, and Oregon.
Richard B. Collins & Dale Oesterle, Structuring the Ballot Initiative: Procedures That Do and Don't Work, 66
U. COLO. L. REV. 47, 48 (1995).
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directly challenges the will of institutionalized players-politicians, judges,
and legislators.
But how was the public mobilized to act, to defy institutionalized leaders,
and to take the law into their own hands?
II. POWER SHIFT
The traditional route for creating law involves an interested group taking its
case to the State Legislature. Legislators hear testimony, vote, and pass laws-
lots of them-which are in turn blessed with a Governor's signature or cursed by
his veto. This traditional process bears almost no resemblance to the process of
reform that has reshaped criminal justice over the past three decades.
The California initiative, embodied in Article II of the California Constitution,
allows California citizens "to bypass the Legislature and go straight to the public
in an effort to place an issue of interest on the ballot for voter approval or
rejection."2 Approved initiatives even provide that they cannot be amended or
repealed by the Legislature without a vote of approval by the electors, and they
are not subject to a Governor's veto.3
By this populist measure, voters gave themselves ultimate authority over
state law. It was not until the late 1970s that California citizens began to exercise
this power in criminal law, a response to their palpable fears. Violent crime rates
in California rose significantly in the 1970s and 1980s. They peaked in 1980.4 By
1980, California's state prison population (98 per 100,000) was thirty percent
below the national average, but the rate of violent crime and burglary was forty
percent above the national average.5
These statistics were the backdrop for sensationalized crimes, as murders
became short-handed by television news. Where and when would the Hillside
Stranger, the Nightstalker, or the Freeway Killer strike next?
Even as crime took center stage as a public concern, criminal justice policy
continued to be driven by an expansion of rights for the criminal defendant. What
the United States Supreme Court under Earl Warren had begun, the California
Appellate Courts, including the State Supreme Court, seemed determined to
continue: expanding rights and process for the accused; limiting the authority of
police to detain, search, and question suspects; and curbing the use of evidence
by prosecutors against criminal defendants.
2. CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, A HISTORY OF THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS 3 (JULY 2001)
[hereinafter CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS],
3. Id.
4. CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN CALIFORNIA, available at http://caag.state.ca.us/cjsc/
publications/misc/cinc/califcrime.pdf (Apr. 2001) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
5. NATIONAL CENTER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA: 1998, available at
http://www.ncpa.org/studies/s219/s219d.html (May 13, 2002) [hereinafter CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA]
(copy on file with the MeGeorge Law Review).
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The legislature, led by liberal Democrats, was, fairly or not, seen as supportive
of the direction of the courts. Criminal convictions were overturned for what
became a term of popular defense, "a legal technicality," and the public increasingly
saw the courts as acting counter to their interests.
As a fearful populace became increasingly frustrated with judges and
legislators, it turned to the initiative process. A new coalition developed. Republican
politicians, in the minority in the state legislature, had long been critical of liberal
courts on policy grounds. They saw the initiative process as a way to distinguish
themselves from the Democrats and strike a political nerve. Meanwhile, public
prosecutors and advocates of crime victims added their voices. And the battle
lines were drawn. The first battle was over the death penalty.
A. Proposition 7-The Briggs Initiative-Murder Penalty (1978)
On March 3, 1893, the first California state-conducted execution was carried
out as Jose Gabriel was hanged at San Quentin State Prison for the murders of an
aged farm couple. 6 Over five-hundred executions by hanging and lethal gas
followed.7
In February 1972, the California Supreme Court opined that "contemporary
standards of decency" had changed. Then-Chief Justice Donald Wright wrote in
the majority opinion of People v. Anderson that the death penalty "degrades and
dehumanizes all who participate."8 In a six-to-one vote, the California Supreme
Court declared capital punishment a violation of the California Constitution's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 9 As a result, more than one
hundred condemned individuals were spared from the gas chamber. Among these
spared individuals were Charles Manson, whose commune family engaged in
ritualistic slaughter, and Sirhan Sirhan, who assassinated Senator Robert Kennedy, a
candidate for President. 0
Then-Governor Ronald Reagan, the quintessential Republican, reacted to the
Court's decision by saying he had made a "terrible mistake" in appointing Wright
as Chief Justice."'
After a lengthy legal tug-of-war, the California Legislature passed a new death
penalty law authored by Republican Senator George Deukmejian; it went into effect
6. CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN CALIFORNIA, available at http://
www.cdc.state.ca.us/issues/capital/capital2.htm (last visited May 2, 2002) (copy on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
7. Dan Morain, California Debate: Agony Over Resuming Executions, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1985, at
Al [hereinafter California Debate].
8. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 656 (1972).
9. Id. at 656-57.
10. CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MURDER & THE DEATH PENALTY: A SPECIAL REPORT TO THE
PEOPLE (1981); California Debate, supra note 7.
11. California Debate, supra note 7.
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in August 1977.2 Significantly, the new law was enacted by overriding the veto of
Democratic Governor Jerry Brown, who opposed the death penalty as a "matter of
conscience."' 3 In a move that would prove even more significant historically, in
the same year, Governor Brown appointed Santa Clara County Public Defender
Rose Bird as Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court. The appointment
was immediately controversial, drawing fire from Republicans, prosecutors, and
crime victims, who prophesized that the new Chief Justice would prove to be a
liberal ideologue. The Governor also appointed Justices Cruz Reynoso and
Joseph Grodin.
14
The 1977 death penalty law passed by the Legislature was a compromise
measure, viewed by Republicans as a watered-down law. Under the measure, the
basic sentence for first-degree murder was "a life sentence with the possibility of
parole," which meant that killers "would become eligible for parole after serving
[only] seven years.' 5 A person convicted of second-degree murder could be out
of prison in as little as four years.'
6
To Republican legislators, the passage of the law was merely a sop to the
public, something that permitted their liberal colleagues to tell their constituents
that they had passed a tough law-and-order statute. Policy and politics mandated
a highly visible campaign to enact a "real" death penalty law. The effort was led
by Republican Senator John V. Briggs from Fullerton, who was seeking the Republican
nomination for governor. Tapping into public sentiment, he paid former Assistant U.S.
Attorney Donald Heller five thousand dollars to draft a new, tougher death penalty law,
17
a "Murder Penalty" bill as it was initially called; it was later referred to as the "Briggs
Initiative."
Supported by many prosecutors and by law enforcement, 18 the initiative provided that
the basic sentence for first-degree murder became twenty-five-years-to-life. Additionally,
special circumstances were added that made more murder offenses capital cases,
making more killers subject to the death penalty. 19
Proponents of the Murder Penalty initiative targeted liberal legislators, claiming
they had made every effort to thwart a death penalty law that protects families
12. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 187, 190 (West 1999 & Supp. 2002).
13. CALIFORNIA DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S ASSOCIATION, TIME LINE, 1974-1999 5 (Feb. 29, 2000); Scott
G. Parker & David P. Hubbard, The Evidence for Death, 78 CAL. L. REV. 973, 977-80 (1990).
14. Parker & Hubbard, supra note 13, at 977-78.
15. CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL, FULL TEXT OF PROPOSITION 7, available at http://holmes.uc
hastings.edu/cgi-bin/starfinder/20313/calprop.txt (last visited Nov. 3, 2002) [hereinafter FULL TEXT OF PROPOSITION 7]
(copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review). A person convicted of second-degree murder faced a term of five,
six, or seven years, and could be out in four years with good time behavior credits. Id.
16. Id.
17. Briggs placed another item on the ballot that sought "to ban homosexuals from teaching jobs," which
lost. "Briggs dropped out of the gubernatorial race for lack of support." Heller later became a death penalty
opponent. California Debate, supra note 7.
18. Id.
19. FULL TEXT OF PROPOSITION 7, supra note 15.
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from "ruthless killers. 20 Proponents invoked in their ballot statement a list of
infamous killers-Charles Manson, Sirhan Sirhan, the Zodiac Killer, the Skid-
Row Slasher, and the Hillside Strangler-as reasons to support Proposition 7.2l
The legislative-passed death penalty was described to voters as follows:
Even if the President of the United States were assassinated in California,
his killer would not receive the death penalty in some circumstances....
If Charles Manson were to order his family of drug-crazed killers to
slaughter your family, Manson would not receive the death penalty....
And, if you were to be killed on your way home tonight simply because
the murderer was high on dope and wanted the thrill, that criminal would
not receive the death penalty.
22
Opponents employed scare tactics of a different sort in an attempt to defeat
Proposition 7. It would, they claimed, result in the death penalty being imposed
too often and in inappropriate cases. For example, a person "could be sentenced
to die for lending another person a screwdriver to use in a burglary, if the other
person accidentally killed someone during the burglary." 23 They also argued that
the initiative was carelessly worded and would result in a waste of taxpayers'
money.24
However, Proposition 7 promised "the protection of the nation's toughest,
most effective death penalty law.",25 Indeed, a poll of Californians showed that
eighty-three percent supported the death penalty-the highest figure since the
California Poll began asking the question in 1956.26
In 1978, the Briggs Initiative was approved by an overwhelming seventy-one
percent of the voters and superseded the 1977 statutes. 27 California voters not
only affirmed their support for capital punishment but also demonstrated their
capacity to express their policy positions at the ballot box in direct defiance of
state legislators and judges.
B. Proposition 8: The Victim's Bill of Rights (1982)
By 1982, the California courts developed their own set of laws, and the State







26. CALIFORNIA DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S ASSOCIATION, Has the Present California Supreme Court
Systematically Blocked Enforcement of the Death Penalty?, in PROSECUTORS' WHITE PAPER ON THE SUPREME
COURT CONFIRMATION ELECTION 3 (1985) [hereinafter Blocked Enforcement of the Death Penalty]. With
amendments, the death penalty law as passed by Proposition 8 is still in effect.
27. FULL TEXT OF PROPOSITION 7, supra note 15.
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Grounds," the California Supreme Court ruled that the State Constitution
provided "wider civil liberties than those afforded by the U.S. Constitution,"
especially in the areas of privacy and rules restricting police conduct.
2 8
Prosecutors and victims' rights activists voiced the anger and angst felt by
many citizens, making the case that the California Supreme Court was readily
willing to "free criminals 'on technicalities."', 29 They claimed the Court's practice
of excluding illegally obtained evidence had become "silly., 30 The response was
Proposition 8, a measure viewed by some as a "war of the people to gain control
of their government."
31
In 1982, the rights of crime victims were a point of controversy. That year,
then-President Ronald Reagan's Task Force on Victims of Crime issued its final
report recommending numerous changes in the criminal justice system, especially as
related to the treatment of victims. Liberals characterized this trend as the
"politicization of the victim" and accused conservatives of rhetorically painting
victims as "sympathetic figure[s]" in an attempt to counterbalance the rights of
defendants.
32
The legal debate marked a political movement towards recognition of victims'
rights. Proposition 8, "The Victim's Bill of Rights," proposed to create new
constitutional protections for crime victims-amending California's Constitution,
imposing restrictions on plea bargaining, abolishing the defense of "diminished
capacity," and restructuring the defense of insanity, providing for a right for
crime victims to receive restitution and a right to testify at parole and sentencing
hearings.33 In addition, the initiative proposed that criminal courts admit "all
relevant evidence' 34-a slap in the face to the courts, which routinely restricted
evidence against criminal defendants. The measure was broad, adding a section
to the state Constitution to give students and staff an "inalienable right to attend
campuses which are safe, secure, and peaceful. 35
Stated in the noblest of terms, the debate over Proposition 8 pitted two important
ideals against one another: the duty of government to protect its citizens from
violent crime and the rights of citizens to be free from overzealous police.
28. Dan Morain, Evidence Decision Reverses 30-Year State Court Trend, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 1985, at
3 [hereinafter Evidence Decision].
29. Id.
30. Id. (quoting Professor Phillip E. Johnson, of the University of California, Berkeley, Boalt School of
Law).
31. Dan Morain, Victims' Bill of Rights Provision Overturned State Supreme Court Says Judges Need
Not Add Five Years to Sentences for Repeat 0/fenders, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 29, 1985, at I (quoting Christopher
Heard of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation).
32. Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victims Rights, 37 STAN. L. REV. 937, 949 (1985).
33. CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL, FULL TEXT OF PROPOSITION 8, available at http://holmes.
uchastings.edu/cgi-bin/starfinder/20313/calprop.txt (last visited Nov. 3, 2002) [hereinafter FULL TEXT OF PROPOSITION 8]
(copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
34. Id.
35. Id.
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But the real driving force behind Proposition 8 was a public sense that a
judicial elite was imposing unrealistic-and at times downright absurd-limits
on the police. Further, elected representatives in the Legislature were bringing
into this inning lower views of the law.
To the public, the Court had increasingly become an Ivory Tower with its
unrealistic expectations of police and prosecutors. Several cases were emerging
demonstrating the Court's detached analysis of legal principles. For instance, the
Court reversed the conviction of James Fries because of the trial court's willingness
to allow a prior robbery conviction to impeach his potential testimony. The court
stated that a robbery conviction is "only partly relevant to credibility, 36 and
expressed sympathy for defendants with prior records who are "far more at the
mercy of the authorities ... than is warranted. 37 In People v. McGaughran,
officers detained a defendant and his passenger after they were driving the wrong
way on a one-way street and acting suspiciously. It took ten minutes to obtain a
warrant check showing an outstanding burglary warrant for the defendant. The
court found the ten-minute delay unreasonable and reversed the conviction.
38
These examples created allies. Prosecutors saw crime victims as a way to
personify and humanize the impact of these decisions. Republican candidates
saw prosecutors and crime victims as their ideological kin.
Republican George Deukmejian, who had by then become Attorney General
and a gubernatorial candidate,39 took the lead, and Republican Senator Pete
Wilson became the Southern California chairman for the Victim's Bill of Rights
Campaign. It was time, they advised, "to take decisive action against violent
crime" and reverse the trend of the courts and legislators who showed "more
concern with the rights of criminals than with the rights of innocent victims. ' 4°
These tools were necessary to keep dangerous criminals off the streets and
protect law-abiding citizens.4' Senior Assistant Attorney General George Nicholson,
a chief architect of the Bill and a top aid to Attorney General Deukmejian, called
it "the most effective anticrime program ever proposed to help the forgotten
,A42victims of crime.
Proponents offered a coherent message that touched people's fear of crime.
Opponents were discouraged, and many were afraid politically to stand in the
way of a juggernaut of public resentment. Those that spoke out were shrill,
claiming the initiative would reduce personal liberties, allow strip searches for
even minor traffic offenders, permit spying and wiretaps, and even take away the
right to bail. 43 They called the initiative a "hoax," a "political ploy," and even
36. People v. Fries, 24 Cal. 3d 222, 229 (1979).
37. Id. at 232 n.10.
38. People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal. 3d 577 (1979).
39. In January 1982, George Deukmejian was sworn in as Governor of California.
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contended that the initiative would take killers off death row and make
convicting people like the "Freeway Killer" (William Bonin) nearly impossible.4
Thoughtful analysts saw Proposition 8 as "a reaction to a series of rulings by
the State's highest court expanding the rights of suspects in criminal cases. 45
Deputy Attorney General William Weisman remarked: "What is the price we pay
for excluding evidence? In many cases, it is crucial evidence, the evidence that is
key for a determination. Many cases cannot even be tried. That is a terrible price
to pay."
46
Proposition 8 was passed by 56.4 percent of the voters in June 1982.47 Its effect
was to force the California Supreme Court to reconsider many of its rulings in criminal
law and procedure. Assistant Attorney General George Nicholson, now himself a
Republican candidate for Attorney General, remarked: "The court can interpret
Proposition 8 narrowly or broadly, but the genie's out of the jar. The public
knows it can play a role in criminal justice.
48
To prosecutors and crime victim advocates the passage of Proposition 8
harbingered a new day. They believed the public had raised itself against
legislative indifference that ignored the reality of crime and frustration over a
judicial system seriously out of whack.
C. The Supreme Court Retention Election (1986)
Theodore Frank was a repeat child molester, convicted of kidnapping and
torturing young children. He served short sentences for his crimes and was
released from Atascadero State Hospital's program for sex offenders with mental
disorders. Two months later, he kidnapped Amy S. from her babysitter's home in
Ventura County. He forced the child to drink beer, raped her, systematically and
brutally tortured her, and murdered her. Amy was two-years-old. Frank was
arrested and prosecuted. In a well-publicized case, a Ventura jury convicted
Frank and sentenced him to death.49
On appeal in 1985, the California Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Mosk, found that evidence seized under an "overbroad" search warrant should
have been suppressed by the trial court. The court ruled that failure to suppress
the evidence was "harmless error" in the guilt phase. However, the evidence was
44. Id. Bonin was found guilty of the rape and murder of fourteen young teens and boys that he picked
up on freeways. He became the first person to die in California by lethal injection on February 23, 1996. Id.
45. Bob Egelko, High Court Changed Some Provisions, Didn't Kill Any 3 Years Later, Victims' Bill of
Rights Survives, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1985, at 16.
46. Evidence Decision, supra note 28.
47. CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS, supra note 2, at 6.
48. Egelko, supra note 45.
49. People v. Frank, 38 Cal. 3d 711 (1985).
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ruled prejudicial in the penalty case.50 To the horror of the public, the California
Supreme Court affirmed Frank's guilt but reversed the death sentence.51 Lawyers, as
well as ordinary citizens, wondered: how could evidence seized pursuant to a
search warrant signed by a judge, ruled admissible by the trial judge, found "non-
prejudicial" in the guilt phase of the trial, now be found of such import to overturn a
sentence of death? When weighed against Frank's horrific crimes and criminal
history, it appeared to many critics, prosecutors, and crime victims that the court
was waging a guerrilla war on the death penalty.
Without declaring the 1978 law via Proposition 7 to be invalid, the California
Supreme Court continually found convictions in individual cases flawed. The
leadership of the California District Attorneys' Association (CDAA) remarked
that despite deep public support for the death penalty, the California Supreme
Court demonstrated pronounced antipathy toward the death penalty by reversing
"some of the most ferocious, bestial, and monstrous crimes ever committed by
human beings" for at times trivial reasons.
52
In fact, more than ninety percent of death penalty appeals were reversed by
the court under the tenure of Chief Justice Rose Bird.53 In 1984 alone, the
California Supreme Court reversed every death penalty case it decided. 54 On the last
day of 1985, the California Supreme Court reversed eleven death penalty homicides;
this would later be called by prosecutors "The New Year's Eve Massacre.,
55
Just as alarming to critics, case reversals followed years of delay-delays
labeled by critics as "unconscionable." From 1979 to 1984, the Court only
managed to hear thirty-three cases, while a backlog of cases was building. 6
Thirty of the thirty-three cases were reversed, and the court's time taken to hear
these cases was "an average of 1,141 days from trial court judgment to decision
on the appeal. 57 The court's "snail's pace" deliberations were in direct defiance
50. Id. at 735. In a second penalty trial, the jury again sentenced the defendant to death. That death
sentence was upheld by the Lucas Court. Frank sat on death row with appeals still pending until his death from
natural causes in September 2001. Id.
51. Id.
52. CALIFORNIA DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S ASSOCIATION, What Are the Facts in Death Penalty Cases?, in
PROSECUTORS' WHITE PAPER ON THE SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATION ELECTION 14 (1985).
53. Blocked Enforcement of the Death Penalty, supra note 26.
54. Associated Press, State High Court Reversed All Its 1984 Death Penalty Cases, S.F. CHRON., Oct.
30, 1984.
55. PROSECUTORS' WORKING GROUP, PROSECUTORS' REPORT: SUPREME COURT JUSTICE CRUZ REYNOSO,
THE NEW YEAR'S EVE MASSACRE: ANALYSIS OF MASS DEATH PENALTY REVERSALS BY THE BIRD COURT 35.
56. Id.
57. CALIFORNIA DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S ASSOCIATION, Has the Present Supreme Court Created
Unconscionable Delays in Death Penalty Cases?, in PROSECUTORS' WHITE PAPER ON THE SUPREME COURT
CONFIRMATION ELECTION 7 (1985). The death penalty was only affirmed in the cases of Earl Jackson, Robert
Alton Harris, and Steve Lamar Fields, none of whom was executed until much later. Robert Alton Harris was
the first person to be executed in thirty years when he was put to death April 21, 1992, for the murders of two
boys in San Diego County.
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of a law that required decisions be reached within 150 days from the date of
certification of the trial court record.58
In their review of cases, the California Supreme Court was accused of creating
a double standard of fairness as it expressed distrust for the testimony of
prosecution victims and witnesses, but expressed confidence in the testimony of
defendants and their witnesses. 59 Observers claimed that the court "consistently
displayed suspicion and animosity toward law enforcement" and ignored precedent.
60
They said capital defendants were given a "bottomless purse" with which to
pursue appeals and that they were permitted to present virtually any evidence
while prosecutors were constantly restrained.6'
Indeed, to many, the court seemed openly hostile toward the prosecution in
criminal cases. This was evident in the California Supreme Court's exercise of its
power to depublish the decision of a lower court, an authority that removes the
binding authority of that decision. In 1982, it depublished pro-prosecution rulings
ninety percent of the time. In the same time period, it only depublished eight
percent of cases with pro-defense rulings.62
Comments from prosecutors were similar to those of Attorney General John
Van de Kamp: "The chances for reversal going in are very, very high. You think
you get to the end of issues, and something else comes up. For the last seven
years, prosecutors have been flying blind without guidance from the court."
63
According to a Deputy Attorney General Edmund McMurray, who litigated
capital cases, "You know you're going to lose. The only question is how."
64
In November 1986, California voters were asked to grant or deny
confirmation of five Supreme Court justices: Rose Bird, Cruz Reynoso, Joseph
Grodin, Stanley Mosk, and Malcolm Lucas. The election was required by a 1934
amendment to the California Constitution requiring appellate justices to go
before the people every twelve years for confirmation. The California voter-
pamphlet explained:
"Under this proposed plan the ultimate control would remain in the
hands of the People .... Any candidate [for justice of the Supreme
Court] would either be recommended by the Governor... or would have
served some time in the office, so that the voters might observe him. The
58. Id.
59. CALIFORNIA DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S ASSOCIATION, Has the Present Supreme Court Set up a Double Standard
of Fairness in Criminal Cases?, in PROSECUTORS' WHITE PAPER ON THE SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATION ELECTION 38
(1985).
60. CALIFORNIA DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S ASSOCIATION, Has the Present Supreme Court Engaged in an Assault
on Law Enforcement and Precedent?, in PROSECUTORS' WHITE PAPER ON THE SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATION ELECTION
40(1985).
61. California Debate, supra note 7.
62. Alan Ashby & Carol Benfell, Esoteric Court Practice Undercuts California Prosecutors, 16 CAL. J.,
137, 138 (1985).
63. California Debate, supra note 7.
64. Id.
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issue would ... [be] whether [the justice] had given to the People the
honest, intelligent, and fearless service they have a right to expect; and
the voter would have a power..., namely that of vetoing an appointment
of the Governor and of casting a vote for or against one particular
candidate on the basis of his fitness for office."
65
Through this measure, voters gave themselves the ultimate control over who
sat on the Supreme Court and the power to veto any appointment. Judicial
elections are different from other elections, since justices appear on the ballot
without opposition with the intent that they be "freed from political influence."
To remove a justice is a drastic step. Since 1934 and the implementation of
Proposition 3, no California Supreme Court justice had lost an election.
66
What followed in 1986 was characterized as an "epic battle" that pitted prosecutors
along with their allies in law enforcement, crime victims, and Republican leaders
against the justices and their defenders in the legal establishment.67 CDAA led the
charge with its Board voting unanimously in February 1985--over a year and a
half before the November 1986 election-to oppose the confirmation of Justices
Bird, Reynoso, and Grodin. 68 CDAA subsequently published a seventy-eight
page "White Paper," a bill of particulars against the Bird Court.
Prosecutors want a return to the constitutionally mandated balance of
rights between victims and criminals, a return to a court which
recognizes legitimate limitations on its authority, and an end to this
court's clear bias against prosecutors and their clients, the victims of
crime and the law-abiding citizens of California. We ask for no unfair
advantage in court and no denial of proper respect for the rights of
defendants. We seek only a reestablishment of a Supreme Court which
recognizes that Justice's sword is two edged because she demands that
the guilty be convicted every bit as much as that the innocent be
acquitted.
69
Initially, Governor George Deukmejian chastised the Court for delays in
deciding death penalty appeals but refused publicly to endorse the attempts to
recall Bird. 70 As the debate over the Bird Court heated up, however, Deukmejian
became increasingly vocal, and, by the time of the election he was spearheading
65. CALIFORNIA DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S ASSOCIATION, Introduction, in PROSECUTORS' WHITE PAPER
ON THE SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATION ELECTION 2 (1985) [hereinafter Introduction].
66. John Balzar, Few Rules to Go By: Justice Bird's Recall Becoming Epic Battle, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 7,
1985, at I [hereinafter Few Rules].
67. Id.
68. Introduction, supra note 65; Few Rules, supra note 66, at I. It was reported that Justice Mosk also
would have been a target had it not been for his pledge to retire. He did not retire, however, and remained on the
Supreme Court for several more years following the 1986 election.
69. Introduction, supra note 65.
70. United Press International, Prosecutor Assails High Court's Record, TUOLUMNE COUNTY UNION
DEMOCRAT, Mar. 20, 1985 [hereinafter United Press International].
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a campaign to defeat Bird, who he said had sabotaged the death penalty by giving
murderers "legal rights and remedies beyond reason."
71
Republican leaders, of one accord in opposition to Chief Justice Bird, were
forthright in their attempt to saddle Democrats with an unpopular cause. In fact,
many Democrats supported Bird. But others, including then-Assemblyman Gray
Davis (now governor), were reluctant to support her and sought to distance
themselves from the Court. One commentator summed up the politics: "Conservatives
are prepared to make it a law-and-order test for Democrats. And Democrats seem
divided, with some of the so-called new breed plainly unhappy at the thought of
being dragged into a do-you or don't-you debate over this court and its record. 72
Democrat Attorney General Van de Kamp said that he was remaining neutral in
the contest despite his critical comments of the court.73
Criminal defense attorneys came to the defense of the Bird court, claiming
the Supreme Court was doing more than its part to battle crime.74 They referred
to the opposition as political partisans and "Republican extremists" involved in a
"court-packing" scheme.75 They launched vitriolic counterattacks, arguing that conservatives
sought to politicize the Court and undermine its judicial independence. 6 The Sacramento
Bee, which supported the Chief Justice, stated:
Undoubtedly the charges will get wilder and nastier as the 1986 primary
election approaches. But it's hardly too early to point out that if any
political sector invites abuse, it's one where the figure being attacked has
only limited means of defense. People who are only ordinary liars in
most political situations can act with impunity when they attack the court
and thus become even bigger liars. And the more they attack it, the more
they undermine not only the justices under attack, but the independence
of the institution itself.
7
Former Governor Jerry Brown called the Republican effort a "court-packing
scheme" as well.78 Other Bird supporters also lashed out, saying the prosecutors'
"White Paper" should have been called the "Red Paper," as "[r]eading it conjures
up images of blood and gore.",79 Rose Bird, who remained distant and for the
most part silent, at last defended her tenure, blaming the federal courts for delays
71. California Debate, supra note 7.
72. Few Rules, supra note 66. Gray Davis failed to support Bird's attempts for reelection despite his
personal friendship with Bird and her having presided over his wedding.
73. Id.
74. Dennis P. Riordan & Elisabeth Semel, Rose Bird Court is.No Friend of Crime, SAN DIEGO UNION,
May 5, 1985, at C4; Kenneth Jost, Hanging on a Feeling, L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 1985.
75. Riordan & Semel, supra note 74.
76. Jost, supra note 74.
77. The Court-Baiting Industry, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 21, 1985.
78. Few Rules, supra note 66.
79. Gerald F. Uelmen, D.A.s' 'White Paper' on Supreme Court Should Be 'Red Paper,' L.A. DAILY J.,
June 18, 1985.
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in death penalty decisions and denying that her decisions represented attacks on
the death penalty.80 In the face of the prosecutor's White Paper critique, the
Committee to Conserve the Courts declared:
We can only surmise that the authors of the White Paper hope the mud
they have hurled will stick, either because of their own positions of
responsibility or because of the public's unfamiliarity with the principles
by which the Court is supposed to, and does, operate .... We are
confident that once the facts are known, the public will prove itself much
harder to fool.
81
But opponents of the justices had grim, gripping facts to point to: dozens of
horrifying murder cases that had been reversed by the Bird Court. Prosecutors
pointed to the cases yet to be decided by the court. Images of criminals like
Lawrence Bittaker peppered the debate. Bittaker was sentenced to death in 1981
for torturing and murdering five teens. His trial featured a tape recording of one
of his victims pleading for mercy while being beaten to death with a sledgehammer.82
Bittaker had recorded the torture so that he could listen to the recording while he
masturbated. His grim moniker was "Pliers," a reference to one of the tools he
used to torture his female victims.83 The Chief Justice, it was noted, had voted to
reverse all of the cases, including Bittaker's.
As the Court's record of reversing death penalty cases reached ninety
percent, there was developing a public sentiment, expressed by one prosecutor
following a jury recommendation for death of a convicted multiple killer: "With
the backlog and the track record of [the California Supreme Court] ... there is no
hope that this death verdict will bring an execution.,
84
It was not difficult, rhetorically, to link the California Supreme Court's
actions to a rising crime rate: "[A] major reason that murder and other violent
crimes have reached intolerable levels," wrote a critic, "is the historic unwillingness
of the California Supreme Court to follow the will of the people.
85
80. Committee to Conserve the Courts, Let the Record Reflect... Errors, Distortions, and Convenient
Omissions in the CDAA White Paper, at 9 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
81. Id. at 51.
82. Niki Cervantes, Mass Killers Often Are Objects of Female Adoration, Experts Say, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 6, 1986, at 2.
83. Philip Hager, Death Sentence Upheld for Killer Who Showed 'Astonishing Cruelty,' L.A. TIMES,
June 23, 1989, at 29. Bittaker's death sentence was finally upheld in 1989, but he remains on death row to this
day. Id.
84. United Press International, supra note 70.
85. Parker & Hubbard, supra note 13, at 979 n.34 (citing CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MURDER &
THE DEATH PENALTY: A SPECIAL REPORT TO THE PEOPLE (1981)).
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Republicans also offered a tit-for-tat response to the court-packing allegations:
There is something disquieting in the criticism directed at Gov.
Deukmejian and others for raining political issues against Chief Justice
Rose Bird and the liberal California Supreme Court. These attacks, it is
argued, drag the court into partisan politics, where it does not belong.
But courts are fundamentally political bodies, and in California judges
are accountable to the voters. If it is a question of partisan political
attack, then one must ask: Who mired this court in partisanship in the
first place, the critics or the justices themselves?86
Defenders of the justices predicted that the "right wing" effort to remove them
would fail. Their prophecy proved wrong.
In November 1986, Justices Bird, Reynoso, and Grodin were voted off the
California Supreme Court bench. Chief Justice Bird lost by nearly a two-to-one
margin. 87 Once again, prosecutors with strong political allies tapped into deeply
felt public sentiment to achieve historic change.
In the same election, George Deukmejian was re-elected to a second term as
governor of California. For conservatives, the 1986 Supreme Court Retention
Election was the "mother lode." For the first time in history, a state Supreme
Court was undone by the voters.
The ouster of the three justices led to a "sudden and pronounced shift in the
political composition of the court." 88 "[Governor] Deukmejian, who had 'pledged
to name law-and-order hard-liners' to replace the defeated justices, elevated
Justice Malcolm Lucas to chief justice." 89 "In [Chief Justice] Bird's final week in
office, she voted to reverse or vacate all six death sentences" before the court. 90
That brought the tally for the court to an astounding conclusion: only four death
sentences affirmed and sixty-four reversed. 9' "Bird herself never voted to affirm
a death sentence. 92
D. Proposition 115-Crime Victims Justice Reform Act (1990)
Unseated, these justices of the California Supreme Court permitted Governor
Deukmejian to reconstitute the court. But given the way the California Supreme
Court does business-one case at a time-and given how conservative justices
86. Tony Quinn, The Fault Lies with the Chief Justice Herself, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 28, 1985 (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).
87. Parker & Hubbard, supra note 13, at 980.
88. Id. at981.
89. Id. (citing The "Onion Field' Parole: Rose Bird's Parting Shot, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 12, 1987, at 26).
Lucas had won the approval of eighty percent of the electorate. The vacancies on the California Supreme Court
were filled by David Eagleson, Marcus Kaufman, and John Arguelles. Id.
90. Id. at 981 n.45.
91. Id.
92. Id. Bird even voted to reverse the case of Robert Alton Harris.
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cling to stare decises, it would take years for the new court to reverse the
decisions of its predecessors. How could prosecutors and crime victims undo the
damage done by the Bird Court, and do it in short order?
They could go to the people of California again with another initiative; this
one, they vowed, would be even more comprehensive. Proposition 115, like Proposition
8 before it, began with recognition of the rights of crime victims. The preamble
to the Proposition read in part:
We the people of the State of California hereby find that the rights of
crime victims are too often ignored by our courts and by our State
Legislature, that the death penalty is a deterrent to murder, and that
comprehensive reforms are needed in order to restore balance and
fairness to our criminal justice system.
93
Further, the Initiative was not subtle in stating that it intended to roll back the
decisions of the Supreme Court under Rose Bird and obviate that legal legacy.
In order to address these concerns and to accomplish these goals, we the
people further find that it is necessary to reform the law as developed in
numerous California Supreme Court decisions and as set forth in the
statutes of this state. These decisions and statutes have unnecessarily
expanded the rights of accused criminals far beyond that which is
required by the United States Constitution, thereby unnecessarily adding
to the costs of criminal cases, and diverting the judicial process from its
function as a quest for truth.94
The authors of Proposition 115 were equally honest about the principles
guiding them:
The goals of the people in enacting this measure are to restore balance to
our criminal justice system, to create a system in which justice is swift
and fair, and to create a system in which violent criminals receive just
punishment, in which crime victims and witnesses are treated with care
and respect, and in which society as a whole can be free from the fear of
crime in our homes, neighborhoods, and schools. 95
The underpinning for public support for Proposition 115 was unquestionably
the statewide movement in 1986 to oust the California Supreme Court Justices.
Deputy prosecutor Anthony J. Rackauckas (now Orange County District Attorney)
stated: "The seeds of Proposition 115 were planted in the aftermath of the anti-
93. CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL, FULL TEXT OF PROPOSITION 115, available at http://holmes.vc.
hastings.edu/cgi-bin/starfinder/20484/calprop.txt (last visited Nov. 3, 2002) [hereinafter FULL TEXT OF PROPOSITION
115] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
94. Id.
95. Id.
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Bird campaign .... It seemed to us that it might take years to undo some of the
damage of many of the Bird court rulings .... We decided there was still work to
be done even with her gone. ' 6
Proposition 115, the "Crime Victims Justice Reform Act," sought major
procedural reform in the criminal justice system. As with Proposition 7, the
Briggs Initiative, this initiative sought not only statutory change; it also sought
constitutional change as well: to limit the procedural rights of defendants while
increasing the rights of crime victims and the authority of District Attorneys.
For prosecutors, the measure would greatly enhance their ability to convict
criminals. For example, although the United States Supreme Court encouraged
reciprocal discovery between prosecutors and defendants, and the California
Legislature had attempted to enact enabling legislation to do so, the California
Supreme Court, during the Bird years, found that such efforts violated
California's Constitution.97 It was against this legislative and judicial history that
the discovery provisions in Proposition 115 came about.
In contrast to the judicial preoccupation during the Bird Court years with due
process for criminal defendants, Proposition 115 identified the function of the
judicial system as a "quest for the truth., 98 Proposition 115 sought to complete
what Proposition 8 had begun-to grant reciprocal rights to crime victims and to
"the People" as represented by the prosecution. Drafted by CDAA, Proposition
115 sought to "re-balance the scales of justice." 99
If adopted by California voters, Proposition 115 would reduce the number of
times crime victims would have to testify and specify the length and type of
examination to which they would be subjected. For the first time, the prosecution
would have the right to due process and a speedy trial-rights defendants had
always enjoyed.'00 To accelerate the pretrial process, the initiative allowed the
use of hearsay evidence at preliminary hearings and instructed California courts
that preliminary hearings no longer could be used for discovery purposes.'°
Proposition 115 also sought to protect the voters' will from legislative or
judicial usurpation. It limited the ability of lawmakers to make legislative amendments
to voter changes. Judges would be prohibited from dismissing a "special
circumstance" that elevated first-degree murder to a capital crime. Further,
judicial involvement in the criminal discovery process was expressly curtailed.'0 2
96. Jerry Hicks, California Elections / Proposition 115: Court Reform Measure Raises Controversy,
L.A. TIMES, May 28, 1990, at BI.
97. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973); People v. Collie, 30 Cal. 3d 43, 56 (1981). See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1102.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 2002) (repealed by Prop. 115, adopted by the people June 5, 1990);
In re Misener, 38 Cal. 3d 543, 558 (1985).
98. FULL TEXT OF PROPOSITION 115, supra note 94.
99. John Balzar, Politics, Propositions: Is It Time for Change?, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 1990, at Al.
100. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 29.
101. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 872(b) (West 1985 & Supp. 2002).
102. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 30; CAL. PENAL COD1 § 1054(e) (West Supp. 2002).
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The drafters of Proposition 115, prosecutors from across the state, initially
attempted to gain support for the changes through the legislature, but they were
unsuccessful. Consequently, they turned to the initiative process but needed help
to get the measure passed. So, they once again looked to two allies: crime victims
and politicians. 103
Collene Campbell, the state chairwoman of the California Crime Victims
Justice Committee, and her husband, Gary Campbell, led the way for victims.
The Campbells' son, Scott, had been murdered and dropped from a private
airplane flying two-thousand feet above the ground near Catalina Island. Five
years of court delays followed the arrest of two of his killers. One of them won a
new trial on appeal, and it was several more years before he was convicted
again. '
0 4
During the same time period, Ms. Campbell's brother and his wife were
murdered in front of their home in the Bradbury area of Los Angeles. As a result
of these horrible crimes and the criminal justice system's treatment of their cases,
the Campbells devoted themselves to getting people involved in this reform
movement. 
05
Political leaders climbed aboard, among them was Republican U.S. Senator
Edward Royce. Supporters tried to get the initiative on the ballot in 1988, fresh
off the California Supreme Court election in 1986, but they were unable to do so
due to lack of money. Then, in 1989, Republican U.S. Senator Pete Wilson from
San Diego endorsed the measure. Wilson was a gubernatorial candidate at the
time, seeking to succeed Deukmejian as the Republican governor.
10 6
Proposition 115 became a "tactical centerpiece" of Wilson's campaign. It
gained him identification with a popular issue, crime fighting. In support of the
initiative, he sounded a familiar theme: "For better than a quarter-century the
state [I]egislature ... has refused to prosecutors, peace officers and the citizens of
this state the protections they are entitled to have .... There is a fundamental
right of all Californians not to be victims."'' 0 7 Wilson personally brought in
almost a million dollars to qualify Proposition 115 for the ballot and advocate its
I08
passage.
Later, supporters of the proposition said: "Without Pete Wilson, there would
be no Proposition 115 .... It was his support that really turned it around for
us."'01 9 Following Wilson's support, Proposition 115 gained endorsements from
103. Hicks, supra note 97.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Daniel M. Weintraub, California Elections / Governor: Deukmejian Backs Wilson on Crime Bill,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1990, at A3.
107. Id.
108. Hicks, supra note 97.
109. Id.
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Governor George Deukmejian, former President Ronald Reagan, and then-State
Attorney General Candidate Dan Lungren. it°
The ballot statement in favor of Proposition 115 included bold language,
seeking to remind voters of recent shocking crimes and to remind them also of
what they did to the Bird Court:
YOUR MOST BASIC RIGHT AS AN AMERICAN IS TO BE SAFE
FROM VIOLENCE AND FREE FROM FEAR. But while politicians
keep talking about tougher laws, your chances of becoming a victim keep
climbing. Why? For years, politicians in Sacramento have refused to
enact tougher laws ... defense lawyers love delays .... It took an
incredible four years just to bring the "Nightstalker" to justice!...
[Proposition 115] assures that no criminal will ever again rape a young
girl and hack off her arms, and serve only a minimal punishment, such as
the 7 /2 years Singleton served. Instead, Proposition 115 will send such a
criminal to prison for life .... ITS "BIRD COURT" DEATH PENALTY
PROVISIONS improve our death penalty law and overturn decisions by
Rose Bird and her allies which made it nearly inoperative."'
A Los Angeles Times poll shortly before the June 1990 primary showed
strong public support for Proposition 115.112 Support for the measure was bi-
partisan, with prominent Democrats, including Dianne Feinstein, running as a
Democratic candidate for governor, and State Attorney General Candidate Arlo
Smith, endorsing the measure. 
13
Opponents of the initiative were creative. Rather than debate crime issues,
they argued that Proposition 115 overturned, albeit inadvertently, abortion rights.
They argued that because Proposition 115 sought to amend special privacy
protections in criminal cases, it threatened the right of women "to safe and legal
abortions" as guaranteed by the California Constitution's privacy clause . 4 The
argument was bolstered by then-Attomey General John Van de Kamp, a Democratic
contender for governor, who opposed the passage of Proposition 115, citing his
belief that "abortion rights" would be jeopardized if it passed. 1
5
Maintaining their oblique attack, opponents also claimed that the proposition
would cost taxpayers millions of dollars due to more court congestion." 16 In fact,
they contended, the initiative had the support of insurance companies who saw
Proposition 115 as increasing the number of criminal trials and reducing California's
110. Id.; Paul Feldman, California Elections Attorney General, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 1990, at A29.
Ill. FULL TEXT OF PROPOSITION 115, supra note 94.
112. Hicks, supra note 97.
113. Hicks, supra note 97; Feldman, supra note Ill.
114. FULL TEXT OF PROPOSITION 115, supra note 94; Boomerang Proposition: The So-Called Speedy Trial
Initiative Would Backfire on California, L.A. TIMES, May 29, 1990, at B6 [hereinafter Boomerang Proposition].
115. John Balzar, California Elections: Governor, Nuances Important as Abortion Rights Support is
Affirmed, L.A. TIMES, May 13, 1990, at A3 [hereinafter Nuances Important].
116. Boomerang Proposition, supra note 115.
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ability to handle civil cases, thereby forcing weary plaintiffs to settle claims."1
7
Criminal defense attorney opponents were more direct, stating that the measure
would impair a defendant's basic right to a fair trial." 8 The arguments of the
opponents sounded alarmist, with Democrat Dianne Feinstein agreeing with
Senator Wilson that the abortion claim was a "smoke screen."' 19 Proponents were
confident of its passage. "It's going to be enacted," said one prosecutor, "[a]nd
when it does, California is going to have a better court system."' 120 In the primary
election of June 1990, voters passed Proposition 115 by 57.3 percent of the vote.12'
Pete Wilson won the gubernatorial election that November.
The passage of Proposition 115 produced historic constitutional and statutory
changes in criminal procedure in California. The genie that escaped back in 1982
was again at work: the public had gone over the heads of legislators and judges to
reshape its justice system.
E. Proposition 184. "Three Strikes and You're Out" (1994)
Between 1978 and 1990, twelve short years, voters turned the criminal justice
system of California on its head by reinstating capital punishment, creating rights
for crime victims, unseating three Supreme Court justices, and re-writing criminal
procedure. What remained to be done in this system overhaul?
Again, the answer would come from the suffering of crime victims. California's
Three Strikes law rose out of unspeakable tragedy. According to Michael Brian
Reynolds, his eighteen-year-old sister Kimber was "the All-American girl."'
122
She grew up in Fresno, California, played varsity tennis, and was president of the
Fresno High School Senate.1 23 Upon graduating from high school, she went away
to art school in Los Angeles.
Ironically, Kimber did not become a victim in the tough urban streets of Los
Angeles. In June 1992, she was in Fresno for a wedding when she left an upscale
Fresno restaurant. 24 Afterwards, she and her friend Greg walked to her car. Her
father, Mike Reynolds describes what happened next:
The motorcycle arrived just in time to prevent Kimber from opening the
door to her car. The driver leaned the motorcycle against Kimber, pinning
her against the car. Greg leaped out of the passenger side of the car and
117. Id.
118. Hicks, supra note 97.
119. Nuances Important, supra note 116.
120. Hicks, supra note 97 (quoting Anthony J. Rackauckas).
121. CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS, supra note 2, at 7.
122. George Skelton, A Father's Crusade Born From Pain, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1993, at A3 [hereinafter
Born From Pain].
123. Id. MIKE REYNOLDS, ET AL., THREE STRIKES AND YOU'RE OUT... A PROMISE TO KIMBER 6
(1996).
124. Born From Pain, supra note 123.
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started around the back to help her. The second man on the motorcycle
jumped off and met Greg halfway with a threatening stance. The driver
attempted to take Kimber's purse. She could offer only minor resistance
but it was enough to provoke the driver. He pulled out his gun, stuck the
barrel in her ear, and in full view of not only Greg but all the customers
in [the restaurant], fired a bullet through Kimber's brain.
125
The "All-American girl" died twenty-six hours later.' 
26
Joseph Michael Davis became the prime suspect in Kimber's murder.
2 7
Davis was a convicted drug dealer who had been paroled two months prior to
Kimber's murder despite his history of violent crime. 28 Wanted by authorities
for several robberies and assaults, Davis had recently vowed never to return to
prison again.1 9 As it turned out, Davis never did return to prison. Less than two
days after Kimber's murder, he died in a gun battle with police. 3 0
Suspect number two was Douglas Walker. Like Davis, Walker was a repeat
drug offender and thief. At the time of Kimber's murder, Walker was supposed
to be serving time on a drug offense, but a judge allowed him to leave prison in
order to visit his pregnant wife with Walker's mere promise that he would come
back. 131 Instead of returning to jail, Walker participated in Kimber's murder as
the "second man" on the motorcycle. Police apprehended him four days after
Kimber's funeral. He was arrested, prosecuted, and convicted. He was sentenced
to nine years in prison; he would be eligible for parole in half that time.
32
The fact that Davis and Walker were out of prison, despite their long
criminal history, incensed Mike Reynolds, who soon learned that Davis's and
Walker's stories were not unique. Based on 1990 data, a Rand Corporation study
found that average murderers in California served 4.2 years in jail, and average
thieves served 2.9 years in jail.1 33 Nationally, an average murderer spent 1.8 years
in jail, while a rapist served sixty days. 34 According to a 1992 study by the
National Center for Policy Analysis, for many "the benefits of crime outweigh
the costs .... [F]or some people, a criminal career is more attractive than other
career options."'
35
125. REYNOLDS, supra note 124, at 12.
126. Born From Pain, supra note 123.
127. REYNOLDS, supra note 124, at 19.
128. Born From Pain, supra note 123.
129. REYNOLDS, supra note 124, at 19.
130. ld. at 22-23.
131. Id. at 11, 19.
132. Id. at 26-27.
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134. Jerry Seper, System Fails to Stop Repeat Offenders, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1993, at A7 (referring
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Mike Reynolds' indignation turned to action. He told Governor Pete Wilson,
"I'm going after these guys in a big way, the kind of people who would murder
little girls this way."' 36 Thirty days after Kimber's murder, Reynolds invited a
number of friends, including lawyers and law enforcement officials, to a meeting
around his backyard picnic table. Their goal was simple: find a way to keep
repeat criminals in jail. That backyard meeting turned into a series of gatherings.137
The group eventually developed a "Three Strikes and You're Out" strategy
that included provisions that would mandate a minimum twenty-five-years-to-life
sentence for criminals convicted of a felony if the criminal had been convicted in
the past of two or more violent or serious felonies. For a criminal with one such
prior conviction, the measure would double this criminal sentence. The maximum
allowable time off for good behavior would be reduced from fifty percent to
twenty percent.'
138
Assemblymembers Bill Jones, a Republican, and Jim Costa, a Fresno Democrat,
agreed to sponsor Reynolds' Three Strikes proposal in the California Legislature.
13 9
The measure would have to be considered and passed by the Assembly
Committee on Public Safety. The Committee was legendary, labeled "The
Graveyard for Criminal Justice Legislation." The initiative was just the kind of
legislation routinely killed by Assembly Democrats under the leadership of
Speaker of the Assembly, Willie Brown. Speaker Brown considered Three
Strikes simplistic and feared that the State would have to compromise education
expenditures in order to pay for it. 140 Thus, despite the fact that Reynolds arrived
at the Capitol with four busloads of people from Fresno for the Bill's first
hearing, Speaker Brown successfully ensured that the committee scuttled the
proposal. 141
Snubbed by the Legislature, Reynolds doggedly kept Three Strikes alive.
"They figured they'd listen to me, pat me on the head, say, 'I'm sorry about your
daughter,' and send me home," Reynolds later recalled. 142 Frustrated by the
traditional political process, Reynolds started a campaign to bring Three Strikes
directly to the voters as a ballot initiative.1
43
With support from the National Rifle Association and the California Corrections
and Peace Officers Association, Reynolds wanted to place the measure in the
November 1994 election.144 But, as of October 1993, Reynolds had only collected
136. Dan Morain, A Fathers Bittersweet Crusade, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1994, at Al [hereinafter A
Father's Bittersweet Crusade].
137. REYNOLDS, supra note 124 at 30-31.
138. Id. at 39.
139. Id. at 35, 39.
140. JAMES RICHARDSON, WILLIE BROWN: A BIOGRAPHY 330 (1996).
141. RICHARDSON, supra note 141; A Father's Bittersweet Crusade, supra note 137; Dan Morain,
Lawmakers Jump on '3 Strikes'Bamwagon, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1994, at A3 [hereinafter '3 Strikes'Bandwagon].
142. A Father's Bittersweet Crusade, supra note 137.
143. Id.
144. Tupper Hull, A Father's Crusade to Lock Up Criminals, S.F. EXAMINER, Dec. 8, 1993, at Al.
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20,000 of the 385,000 signatures needed to get the measure on the ballot.145 It
took another horrible tragedy for Three Strikes to make it to the voters.
In October 1993, an intruder kidnapped twelve-year-old Polly Klaas from her
Petaluma, California, home during a slumber party. Two months later, in the
midst of frantic efforts by Polly's parents to locate her, authorities found Polly's
lifeless, brutalized body in a field near Cloverdale, California. The chief suspect,
Richard Allen Davis, admitted to abducting and murdering Polly, and prosecutors
later alleged that Davis had sexually abused her. 146
It became publicly known that Richard Allen Davis, like Joseph Michael
Davis and Douglas Walker, was a repeat violent offender who had taken
advantage of the parole system-in fact, he had once served only one year of a
fifteen-year burglary sentence. 47 Had Richard Allen Davis served the entire
sentence for his most recent known offense, he would have been incarcerated on
the day he abducted Polly. 1
48
Kimber's and Polly's murders were more than Californians could endure.
The day after Polly's body was found, the Fresno area "800" system was
overwhelmed due to call volume to the "Three Strikes and You're Out" hot
line. 149 Within three days after authorities discovered Polly's body, Reynolds
gathered fifty-thousand signatures. 150 He ultimately obtained 800,000 valid
signatures, well beyond the number required to place the initiative on the November
ballot.1 5 1 Three Strikes became Proposition 184.
The rhetoric surrounding the murders and Proposition 184 was emotional and
intense. Governor Pete Wilson led the way. He spoke at Polly's funeral. With
extraordinary words for a child's funeral, Governor Wilson said he would fight
for laws "ensuring that career criminals become career inmates" and threw his
support behind Three Strikes.'52 His anger at Richard Allen Davis was palpable
and undisguised. The day after the funeral his language was markedly non-
gubernatorial: "I mean, when I think of that son of a bitch, you cannot help but be
angered. Did you see the picture of him on the front page of the (San Francisco)
145. Richard Kelly Heft, Legislating With a Vengeance, INDEPENDENT, Apr. 26, 1995, at 27; Louis
Galvan, "Three Strikes" Law Poses Justice Issues: Forum Hopes to Generate Discussion About Crime and Its
Solutions, FRESNO BEE, May 9, 1994, at B1.
146. REYNOLDS, supra note 124, at 70; Mary Curtius, Klaas Killer Sentenced to Die, Stuns Court, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 1996 at AI.
147. REYNOLDS, supra note 124, at 70.
148. Richard Price, Cruel Lesson. Why Polly Died, Town Angry at a System that Failed, USA TODAY,
Dec. 8, 1993, at lA.
149. '3Strikes'Bandwagon, supra note 142.
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152. George Skelton, Wilson Seizes the Day After Polly's Murder, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1993, at A3.
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Chronicle? Smirking? Jesus, boy. I wanted to just belt him right across the
mouth."
153
Opponents attacked Proposition 184, primarily on two grounds. First, they
argued that it was too costly. According to the California Department of
Corrections, Proposition 184 would incarcerate more than 100,000 long-term
criminals by 2001 at a cost of $500 billion to build 20 new prisons., 54 Second,
opponents claimed that Proposition 184 would incarcerate non-violent offenders.
This argument gained credibility when a small-time criminal was arrested for
stealing $151 from a sandwich shop in Washington,' 55 which had a law similar to
Three Strikes; under that law the defendant faced the possibility of life in
prison.156
As of February 1994, more than eighty percent of likely California voters
supported a Three Strikes bill. 57 This public pressure forced the Assembly to
respond as Assemblymembers Jones and Costa reintroduced Reynolds' Three
Strikes law while other legislators introduced four similar but competing
measures. 158 Reynolds's message to the Assembly was clear: "pass [the Three
Strikes law] or the voters will do it for you."'
159
All five Three Strike bills moved swiftly through committee. 160 In the end,
the Assembly approved Reynolds's bill by a vote of fifty-nine to ten, and the
Senate approved it twenty-nine to seven.' 6' Governor Wilson signed the Bill into
law on March 7, 1994, with Reynolds by his side.
162
Despite the legislative victory, Reynolds refused to remove Proposition 184
from the ballot. Public sentiment for the law was strong, and passage as an
initiative would make it less susceptible to modifications by the Legislature.
63
Polls showed that, come November, the proposition would pass. 1
64
The measure became a political wedge issue. Governor Wilson used the
Three Strikes initiative to distinguish himself from Democratic gubernatorial
contender Kathleen Brown. Wilson television ads stated that Wilson and Brown
153. Id.
154. Dan Morain, "Three Strikes" Bill Clears State Legislature, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1994, at Al
[hereinafter "Three Strikes" Bill Clears State Legislature].
155. John Balzar, The Target: Repeat Offenders, Washington State Voters Pioneered the Three-Strikes
Idea, but a $151 Robbery Case May Test ifThey Got the Law They Wanted, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1994, at A5.
156. Id.
157. "Three Strikes" Bill Clears State Legislature, supra note 155.
158. Id.; REYNOLDS, supra note 124, at 86.
159. Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
395,412-13 (1997).
160. Sze, supra note 134, at 1054.
161. Greg Lucas, Assembly Passes "3 Strikes" Bills, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 1, 1994, at A13; Vlae Kershner,
State Senate Approve "3 Strikes" by Big Margin, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 4, 1994, at A3.
162. Daniel M. Weintraub, "3 Strikes" Law goes into Effect, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1994, at A5.
163. A full two-thirds Assembly majority would be required to amend the constitutional amendment
proposed by Proposition 184. CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § I.
164. Edward Epstein, Poll Finds Few Voters Know About Fall Initiatives: 'Three Strikes' Measure is the
Only Exception, S.F. CHRON., July 28, 1994, at A 17.
2002 / The Development of Criminal Justice Policy in California
were "as different as two people can be."' 165 "On crime, Pete Wilson was the
force behind the tough new 'three strikes' and 'one strike' laws [and] he has
enforced the death penalty.... Brown opposes the death penalty, is supported by
criminal defense lawyers, and will appoint more lenient judges.,
166
The official voters' packet employed the catch phrase "Three Strikes and
You're Out" to full advantage:
Proposition 184 keeps rapists, murderers and child molesters behind bars
where they belong. Police, taxpayer, crime victim and prosecutor organizations
support Proposition 184. Let's make California safe for children, families
and seniors again. 3 STRIKES SAVES LIVES AND TAXPAYER DOLLARS!
Let's tell serious/violent career criminals "3 Strikes and You're Out!',
167
An extraordinary seventy-two percent of the California voters approved the measure. 168
F. Proposition 21: The Gang and Violence Crime Prevention Act (2000)
In 2000, California voters were presented with the Gang Violence and
Juvenile Crime Prevention Act. The measure, known as Proposition 21, proposed
to increase the instances when juveniles could be tried as adults. Advocates
claimed that Proposition 21 modernized the juvenile justice system by responding
to increasing violent youth crime. Opponents argued that Proposition 21 sold
children out to a punitive adult criminal system that failed to rehabilitate or
reform. Proposition 21 signaled Californians' dissatisfaction with the juvenile justice
system. It presented voters with yet another option to reshape crime and
punishment in California.
The California juvenile justice system dates back to 1909, but the current
configuration came about in the early 1940s after fourteen-year-old Barney Lee
was sentenced to San Quentin State Prison for killing his uncle. 169 The possibility
of a fourteen-year-old child doing adult time with adult criminals led to the
creation of the California Youth Authority, a division of the State Department of
Corrections. 1
70
Until Proposition 21, the law provided that any criminal offender under
eighteen years of age automatically came under the purview of the juvenile
courts. If the prosecution considered the minor "unfit for treatment" in the
juvenile system or accused the juvenile of an enumerated serious crime, the
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prosecutor could ask the court to adjudicate the minor in the adult criminal
system. After an investigation and report by a probation officer, the court would
consider various circumstances about the juvenile and the crime and make a
decision.171 If the court agreed with the prosecution, the minor would be adjudicated
as an adult.
Like other states, California steadily lowered the age that juvenile offenders
could be tried as adults. By 1995, fourteen- and fifteen-year-old minors could be
tried in adult court for murder and other serious crimes. The court could still
sentence a minor who was adjudicated in the adult system to the Youth
Authority, unless the minor was convicted of certain serious felonies or received
a sentence of over twenty-five years.' 72 Proposition 21, however, would change
this.
There is no question that juvenile crime increased during the twentieth
century, and particularly the second half. According to a 1940 poll, teachers' top
discipline concerns seemed mild: talking out of turn, making noise, cutting in
line, littering, chewing gum, running in the halls, and dress code violations. 73 By
1990, teachers were complaining of illegal drug abuse, alcohol abuse, pregnancy,
suicide, rape, robbery, and assault. 74 Many states responded by abandoning
rehabilitation as an attainable goal and focused on straight-forward punishment. 1
75
Governor Pete Wilson championed Proposition 21.176 When a minor was
accused of committing certain violent crimes or had previously been adjudicated
a ward of the court, Proposition 21 would allow prosecutors to file charges
against certain minors directly in a criminal court-no determination of juvenile
court unfitness was required. The initiative would decrease the minimum age,
from sixteen to fourteen, when a juvenile offender could be adjudged in criminal
court. The initiative would also broaden the circumstances when a minor would
be sent to prison instead of to the Youth Authority.' 77
The debates over Proposition 21 contained rhetoric typical of California
ballot initiatives. Indeed, Governor Wilson had summed up his view of juvenile
crime almost five years before Proposition 21 was presented to the California
voters: "If a 14 year old punk does adult crime," Wilson declared, "he does adult
time."
178
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In 1998, Wilson penned an opinion article in the San Francisco Examiner in
which he elaborated on his crime policy views. While overall crime was at its
lowest level in over thirty years, Wilson wrote that, "[b]etween 1967 and 1995,
arrests of juveniles in California rose 260 percent for robbery and nearly 300
percent for murder."' 179 To remedy this, he asked the California Legislature to
"requir[e] juvenile murderers and rapists to be tried as adults," to "classifly] all
gang-related felonies as 'strikes"' for purposes of Three Strikes, and to "mak[e]
gang-related murderers eligible for the death penalty or life without the possibility of
parole."'
180
Governor Wilson said that he would not stand "idly by" while the Legislature
debated these reforms; instead, he would seek to place the Gang Violence and
Juvenile Crime Prevention Act on the 2000 ballot.' 81 In fact, a ballot initiative
may have been the Governor's only option. Between 1995 and 1998, the Legislature
considered many bills to reform the juvenile justice system, but most bills never
made it to Wilson's desk. Proposition 21 contained many of those failed
legislative efforts. 1
8 2
When Wilson left office in 1998, a critical infrastructure of support for
Proposition 21 existed. The new governor, Gray Davis, backed the measure, as
did other law enforcement groups. 183 In the weeks prior to the March 2000 vote,
Wilson and others argued that Proposition 21 was a modernization effort and a
much-needed response to increasing juvenile crime.1 84 According to Wilson, the
juvenile justice system was designed in the 1940s for youths whose "offenses
included truancy, curfew violations and fistfights ... petty theft and vandalism."'
' 85
"It was never intended or designed to handle gang murderers with semi-
automatic weapons or rapists preying upon innocent women. ' 86 Dave LaBahn,
deputy director of California District Attorney's Association (CDAA), stressed
that "[t]he concept is not to throw away the system ... the concept is to get the
most violent offenders into adult court.'
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Among the notable opponents of the measure were the Reverend Jesse
Jackson and Cardinal Roger M. Mahoney, the archbishop of Los Angeles. 8 '
Opponents estimated that Proposition 21 would require one billion dollars in new
correctional facilities. 8 9 Mahoney argued that these added costs would be better
spent on rehabilitation and prevention programs. 190 He said that: "children sent
through the adult system, where there are minimal opportunities for rehabilitation
and where their physical and emotional survival is constantly being threatened,
are destined to come out of prison as hardened criminals."'
' 91
In speaking to the Los Angeles County supervisors, Jackson's tone reflected
his ministerial training.
I urge you to vote no on [Proposition] 21 because of the madness that we
see taking place in our country today, which we call zero tolerance ....
That's the opposite of development. It is the opposite of grace and
mercy. In justice, you balance the scales because there are circumstances
at the crossroads .... Do we choose the development of our youth or the
degradation of them? Do we choose the development of our youth or do
we reject them?
192
The supervisors of Los Angeles agreed with Jackson by voting to oppose
Proposition 2 1.93
Both sides cited statistics. Proposition 21 advocate, Ventura County District
Attorney Michael Bradbury, cited California Department of Justice statistics to
show between 1983 and 1998 there had been a 60.6 percent increase in juvenile
murder, rape, robbery, attempted murder, and aggravated assault. 194 Meanwhile,
the liberal Justice Policy Institute claimed that juvenile felony arrest rates
dropped more than forty percent in California between 1978 and 1998, a statistic
that defied the public's intuitive notion of reality.1 95 Nevertheless, in the primary
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election of March 2000, sixty-two percent of California voters approved Proposition
21, and the measure became law.'
96
G. The Drug Propositions. Propositions 215 and 36
While the voters were busy raising the stakes for serious criminal conduct,
there were other forces at work with a very different agenda-to make accessible
drugs for treatment and treatment for drugs. In the past few years, California has
followed the lead of a number of states in adopting alternatives to incarceration
for nonviolent drug offenders. 97 The trend has tended to be more bipartisan. The
course may have "been driven by a drop in crime, fiscal constraints, and waning
public support for imprisoning nonviolent felons."'
198
Proposition 215 was put to the voters in November 1996. It proposed to exempt
patients, their caregivers, and their physicians from criminal laws for using
marijuana for medical treatment. 199 Supporters had previously gotten bills for
similar efforts passed by the California Legislature, but then-Governor Wilson
vetoed the legislation.
In contrast to earlier crime initiatives, medical marijuana advocates enlisted
medical professionals to further their cause.2°° Proponents argued that the initiative
would help ease the pain of seriously and terminally ill patients with such
diseases as cancer and AIDS. They appealed to sympathy and asked voters to
join them to "relieve suffering., 20' Some politicians and San Francisco District
Attorney Terence Hallinan supported the measure.20 2 Hallinan stated, "I support
it because I don't want to send cancer patients to jail for using marijuana."
Long on sympathy, Proposition 215 was short on science. Organizations such
as the American Cancer Society opposed the initiative's passage because of
marijuana's harmful physical and psychological effects.20 3 Meanwhile, Attorney
General Dan Lungren, CDAA, and most other law enforcement agencies opposed
the measure, citing the lack of written guidance and limitations of the proposal.20 4
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They feared the proposition would protect drug dealers from prosecution, provide
legal loopholes, and make it legal for people to smoke marijuana in public
places-"next to your children. 20 5
Despite the fears and lack of support from most law enforcement agencies,
the Medical Use of Marijuana initiative passed with fifty-six percent of the
vote.206 Immediately, jokes popped up such as: "Wonder what that victory party
was like" and "Now if we can just get HMOs to cover the cost of Doritos and
Oreos."
20 7
Not everyone was laughing. Attorney General Dan Lungren ordered a
meeting of law enforcement officials and prosecutors to discuss the implications
of the passage. His spokesman said: "We have legal anarchy. No one knows what
this means. 20 8 Other law enforcement opponents expressed concern about the
poor wording and lack of direction provided by the initiative. "We're not really
sure what we can and can't do now. What constitutes an acceptable amount (of
marijuana)? Who qualifies as a caregiver? It's going to be a big mess," stated
Tom Gorman, spokesman for the California Narcotics Officers' Association.
20 9
In fact, the measure provided little definition as to who was exempt and what
circumstances were exempt from prosecution. Today, six years after its passage,
law enforcement officers and prosecutors still complain of a lack of clarity and
say that the initiative is unworkable. 10
While law enforcement seeks guidance from courts and legislators, California
juries have "demonstrated a marked resistance to convicting defendants who mount
a credible medical marijuana defense."'211 Advocates of the measure have "launched
a political offensive against prosecutors in several California counties," including a
failed attempt to recall the Marin County District Attorney in April 2001.21 2
Four years after the passage of Proposition 215, its proponents sponsored
Proposition 36. This initiative proposed probation and drug treatment, rather than
incarceration, for certain drug offenses. 21 3 Ostensibly, the proposition was limited
to crimes of simple drug possession, and it made ineligible for treatment
offenders with prior violent felonies or offenders charged with crimes other than
a drug offense.214
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Those supporting Proposition 36 claimed that "the war on drugs has failed."
They contended that nonviolent drug users were overcrowding California jails,
while violent criminals were being released.21 5 Proponents repeatedly stated that
it was a cost issue, the idea being to "turn addicts into productive citizens, so they
pay taxes and stop committing crimes to support their habits. 216
Opponents argued that the proposition would essentially decriminalize drugs
like PCP, heroin, and "date rape" drugs-"the hard drugs behind most child
abuse, domestic violence, sexual attacks and other violent and theft-related
crimes in California., 2 7 They also said that it would hurt legitimate drug
treatment programs, like the successful drug courts and potentially put violent
drug abusers on the street.218 They countered with their own cost claims, stating
that it would cost over $660 million dollars to implement the provisions of the
proposition.219
Many judges opposed Proposition 36, stating that it tied their hands and
lacked sanctions. Orange County Superior Court Judge C. Robert Jameson
asked: "An attorney offers a client a suspended three-year prison sentence and
Drug Court, or Proposition 36, where you can get probation and attend Joe's
Drive-Thru Rehab. Which do you think they'll want?" 220 "Some in law enforcement
say privately it could result in fewer drug arrests. Police won't spend time on
cases where the bad guys can't get punished.
22 1
Party lines were blurred. Governor Gray Davis opposed Proposition 36 as did
222State Attorney General Bill Lockyer, both Democrats. 2 So did most Republicans.
To the surprise of many, Proposition 36 passed by garnering a "whopping sixty
percent" of the vote.
223
III. CONCLUSION
Californians have cast their criminal justice system in a mold of their own
making. Their votes on major policy issues in criminal justice show their
rebellious streak-a willingness to bypass the legislature and defy the courts in
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California may be ahead of its time. In April 2002, President George W.
Bush called for amendment to the United States Constitution to protect rights of
violent crime victims. Some have criticized the attempts as "taking a roller to a
Rembrandt," but Bush stated that this was "one of those rare instances when
amending the Constitution is the right thing to do. 224 Attorney General John
Ashcroft said, "too often in the quest for justice, the rights of these victims have
been overlooked or ignored. It is time-it is past time-to balance the scales of
justice, to demand fairness and judicial integrity not just for the accused but for
the aggrieved as well. 225 Those statements are reminiscent of those made in
California back in 1982 and 1990, when Californians put victims' rights into the
law.
What has been the result of the changed system? By the end of the 1980s,
California's serious crime rate declined to twenty-two percent above the national
226average, and crime rates continued to fall dramatically throughout the 1990s.
How much of the decrease is directly attributable to the reforms of Proposition 8,
Proposition 115, and Proposition 184, will be debated and discussed. There are,
of course, those ideological children of Rose Bird who are closed to the
possibility that a system which emphasizes accountability can translate into a
safer society. But for intellectually honest observers, facts matter. The system
was reformed dramatically, and crime dropped precipitously. It is not all
coincidence.
From a policy perspective, the last thirty years in criminal justice policy have
brought a shift of power away from the legislative and judicial branches and into
the hands of the executive branch. More importantly, it has also brought a shift of
authority into the hands of voters. Of eight criminal justice initiatives placed on
the ballot since 1978, a remarkable one-hundred percent have been approved by
the voters. 227 The lesson is clear: if politicians, legislators and judges are not in
step with the voters, they will be left behind.
In California, it is the electorate who is the final arbiter of criminal justice
policy. At some point, the genie got out of the jar, and there is no putting it back in.
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